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I 
At its sittings of 18 June 1981 and 14 September 1981 the European Parliament, 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, referred the motions for resolutions 
by Mr Cottrell (Doc. 1-313/81) and by Mr Welsh, Sir Fred Catherwood, Sir John 
Stewart-Clark and Sir Fred Warner (Doc. 1-203/81) to the Committee on EKternal 
Economic Relations as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs and the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment for an 
opinion. 
At its meeting of 20 October 1981 ~he Committee on EKternal Economic Relations 
decided to draw up a report and appointed Mr R.E. Filippi rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 2 December 1981, 
22 September 1982, 18 October 1982, 4 November 1982 and 24 November 1982 and at 
the last meeting adopted the motion for a resolution by 20 votes to 0 with 5 
abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Sir Fred Catherwood, chairman; 
Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, first vice-chairman; Mr van Aerssen, second vice-chairman; 
Mr Seal, third vice-chairman; Mr Filippi, rapporteur; Mr Almirante, Mrs Baduel-
Glorioso, Mr Bonaccini (deputizing for Mr Alavanos>, Mr Bord, Mr Calvez, 
Mrs Gredal (deputizing for Mr Caillavet>, Lord Harmar-Nicholls (deputizing for 
Mr Spencer), Miss Hooper, Mr Lemmer, Mrs Nielsen, Mr Paulhan, Mr Pesmazoglou, 
Mrs Pruvot, Mr RadouK, Mr Rieger, Mr Seeler, Mr Stella, Sir John Stewart-Clark, 
Sir Fred Warner and Mr Ziagas. 
Neither the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs nor the Committee on 
Social Affairs and Employment will be delivering an opinion. 
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A 
.The Committee on External Economic Relations.·hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory 
statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
-------~-------~-------
on imports of Japanese cars into the EEC 
!b!.~~t2e!!n_ftt~i!!!o!, 
- having regard to its resolution drawn up by Mr Bonaccini on behalf of the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary·Affairs,1 
- having regard to the motions for resolutions by Mr Welsh, Sir Fred Catherwood, 
s·;r John Stewart-Clark and Sir Fred warner <Doc. 1-203/81> and by Mr Cottrell 
<Doc. 1-313/81), 
- having regard to the ~eport of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
(Doc. 1-997/82>, 
A. considering the need for an improved balance of trade between the Com•unity 
and Japa~, 
B. having regard to the .. ~onsiderable 'import penetration by Japanese cars into 
the Community market, 
c. considering the existence of non-tariff barriers to trade which inhibit 
increased Community penetration ·of the Japanese market, 
D. having regard to the major economic and strategic importance of the car sector 
for the European Community and its Member Statea, 
E. convinced of the need to strengthen the ~ompetitive position of the car 
industry to enable it to play its proper:role on the international economic 
stage, 
F. having regard to the major conaequences ~hich the crisis in the car industry 
is having on employment and the resultin~ effects on social, industrial and 
economic development in the countries of. the Community, 
1. Considers that the preconditions for a thriving Comeunity car industry consist 
of: 
1 
<a> establishing fair terms of trade between the Coeaunity and its major 
competitors in the car sector, 
Doc. 1-673/80- OJ No. C 23, 9.2.1981 
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<b> ensuring that the Community's car industry receives appropriate support by 
means of an effective Co!ftm~nity industrial policy which encompasses the 
car industry; 
2. Insists that the Community continue to impress on the Japanese Government the 
need for freer access for Community products,including car~ to the Japanese market; 
3. Calls - in agreement with the Commission, in accordance with the Mandate of 
30 May 1980 and with a view to improving the potential outlets for EEC 
products on the world markets - for a new concept of Community industrial 
policy, which must now be implemented wit~out delay1; 
4. Hopes that measures will be adopted in the context of this Community pOlicy 
which are designed to improve the competitiveness, efficiency and market 
position of European car exports and which will gua~antee the industry both 
outtets within the Community and appropriate opportunities for expansion on 
foreign markets; 
5. Emphasizes that the Community as such rather than the ind·ividual Member States 
should be represented in the negotiations with its Japanese and US competitor~ 
in order to strengthen its negotiating p~sition and insists that the Member 
States should enable the Commission to d~fend this position, in agree•ent 
also with the Coun~il Decision of 22 March 1981 introducing a common global 
strategy towards Japan; 
6. Considers it necessary to develop a system of marketing· and distribution of 
sales among European producers comparabl' with the system already operating 
in Japan and the United States; 
7. Considers it essential to enco~rage c.toser cooperation between European 
firms with a view to competing increasingly at international level, and 
to assist the Commission in its task of monitoring national aids so as 
to prevent distortions and imbalances; 
8. Acknowledges that a certain level of coordinated basic research is needed 
' ;, 
in sectors such as new materials, combustion processes and n'w automation 
techniques so as to prevent dispersion of resources and the duplication of 
' - ' . -, 
similar basic research projects in various places in the Community; 
1 See: .A Community strategy to develop Europe's industry·COM<81> 639 final p.2 
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9. Recom~ends, with. a· view to 1ncreasing proth.icfivity in the Europi~n car industry, 
·that steps ·~·h·~ulcfbe tak·;;ri .t·~(Peduce: s.t'ill further the .. present fragmentati'on 
and lack of coordination of car production w~ich~ !Q!!t_!ii!, prevent the 
·.f:t· implementation of the ·es·senHal· ttcononl'te\s \cf •scale whi·c-h ire precisely what 
gives our competitors their advantage; ·· 1 • 
10. StressPs that the propo5al referred to in the previous paragraph stands the 
best chance of success if it is implemented by the car industries themselves, 
which sbould get together at Com.unity level, together with representatives 
of the trade unions, with the support of ~ommunity bodies in order to 
coordinate the various agreements and exc~anges of views; 
11. Considers it necessary to establish great~r balance on the world market by 
stressing the mutual interests of the Com~unity and its competitors through 
a formal dialogue;. 
12. Calls for measures to develop and extend a constructive dialogue between 
employers organizations and the trade unions with a view to preventing the 
creation of disparities in social conditions in the various Community 
industries; 
13. Emphasizes that, in order successfully to negotiate with Japan and our other 
trade partners, the Community should develop a joint trading policy in the 
car sector and abandon existing national import control measures such as 
quotas and quantitative restrictions; 
14. In order to enable such an agreement to be satisfactorily reached, calls 
on the M!mber States to agree a~ong themselves and with the Commission on 
the distribution of Japanese imports of motor vehicles into the Community; 
15. Requests management and workers to create the conditions needed to facilitate 
Japanese investments in the Community; 
16. Acknowledges the desirability of further investment by Japan, either as sole 
shareholder or on the basis of joint ventures, but considers it essential to 
prevent such investment leading to surplus capacity in this sector and feels 
that it should be accompanied by a corresponding willingness on Japan's part 
to look to Community suppliers for a substantial proportion of its components; 
Japanese investors should also be asked.to bring research and development 
facilities to those countries in which they intend to start production; 
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17 ~ Considers. it necessary to establish close cooperati()fl be'twee~ the Mellber States 
and the Community with a view to reaching agreeMent on .t~e ter.s ,nd conditions 
to b~ offered to Japanese investor~; 
18. In!;tructs its Pres'ident to forward this resolution and the reJ)9rt o.f its 
committee to the Commhsion and Council .• 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. !~!HQQY£!!Q~ 
The 1980s will without doubt prove to be the period of greatest 
uncertainty and imponderables in the history of Community industry. 
After the 1960s, which were characterized in general by full employment, 
and after the 1970s, during which the situation in European industry, though 
giving cause for concern, was still acceptable, the 1980s seem to be full 
of uncertainty and are marked by a new and extremely aggressive form of 
competition. 
In view of the profound changes in the world economic situation and 
of the continuing economic crisis it is now more than ever essential for 
the Community to undertake a tho.rough review and reassessment of its acti-
vities. The European Community will have to evolve and adapt in order 
to face up to an economic situation which is totally different from that 
of the 1950s, the era of its foundation, or of the 1960s, the era of its 
consolidation. 
First and foremost it should be pointed out that the problems facing 
the European car industry must be resolved in the context of a new concept 
of Community industrial policy, which must be implemented without delay. 
This is the only way to place Europe in a sufficiently competitive 
position to face up to the increasingly stiff competition facing its industries 
not only on external mark,ts but also, and above all, on Communi·ty territory. 
II. COMMUNITY INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE PROBLEMS FACING 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------!tls_sYBQfsa~_£aB_l~2Y§!B!-~Y§!_§s_§Qb~52 
' 
A further reason why appropriate and effective solutions to the problems 
facing the European car industry should be sought in the context of an 
industrial policy is that the car industry may be seen as the keystone of 
the European industrial structure. 
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Moreover, the Community is to a large extent at the mercy of the inter-
national division of labour and conditioned by its development model, based 
on the consumption of raw materials and energy, which makes it particularly 
dependent on the supplier countries. This is a further reason why global 
choices must be made which are not confined to solving sectoral problems 
but which include the whole of the Community in joint decisions of both 
a political and a technical and economic nature. 
·The recurrent temptation to seek 'national solutions' ignores the fact 
that, unless a Community solutio~ is found, there could be a rapid return 
to protectionism, the closing of borders, European nationalism and hence 
the final loss of a competitive position on the world market. 
~n ·broad outline these are the requirements for a Community industrial 
policy without which Europe runs the risk of becoming a province of a kingdom 
totally alien to us. 
The Treaty of Rome is dominated by the concept of the market and the 
need to create a large liberaliz~d trade area. The authors of the Treaties 
believed that the creation of a large new integrated economic area would 
itself lead to profound ·changes in the European industrial structure which 
they felt would materialize as a consequence, largely spontaneous, of the 
setting up of a single market. 
The serious·limitations of this view can now clearly be seen, following 
the implementation·of the customs union and the creation of a single European 
market and, above all, following the major changes in the international 
economic order. 
An industrial structure of national or sectoral scope is no longer 
conceivable given a market which now covers continental Europe, whose develop-
ment prospects are largely depe~dent on its export capacity, and which is 
governed by a form of competition in many cases deriving from the confronta-
tion between social and economic models profoundly different from that of 
the Community. 
It is essential to re-establi~h a European industrial policy capable 
of giving our industries the necessary competitive edge to guarantee them 
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in the future not only the maintenance of their ~utlets within the Community 
but also, and above all, adequate opportunities to assert themselves on 
the external markets. 1 
The problems facing European industry may be summarized as follows: 
- the Community's share in world exports of manufactured products is 
decreasing while the USA's is stable and Japan's increasing; 
- a decline in the growth of ind~strial productivity in Europe, partly as 
a result of inadequate productive investment. Competitiveness in Europe, 
as measured by unit labour costs, declined in relative terms between 
1960 and 1980. According to the US Department of Labour, unit labour 
costs are increasing in the seven largest countries of the Community by 
an average of 8.7% per year, compared with 7.4% in Japan and 3.9% in the 
United States.2 
As stated by the Commission, the new industrial policy must be designed 
to revive productive investment, increase confidence among investors, develop 
the internal market by consolidating it into a genuine European economic 
area and introducing Community preference where industrial development is 
linked to intervention by the public authorities, particularly with regard 
to technical standards and public orders. 
1 Brief mention should be made of the principal measures taken by the European 
Community in the field of industrial policy. The first global concept 
2 
of this policy was defined in the memorandum of 18 March 1970 <the Colona 
plan). A second attempt was made, in the Davignon report of 1978, to 
define Community action aimed at implementing an industrial policy which 
was to be incorporated into an overall strategy for the resumption of 
expansion, in order gradually to eliminate unemployment through the creation 
of new jobs. Most recently, in May 1980 the European Council instructed 
the Commission to draw up a series of proposals for the restructuring 
of all the sectors in the Community. The Community's role in the 
development of its industry i~ one of the fundamental themes in the analysis 
of the future of Europe for which the mandate of May 1980 provides both 
the opportunity and the framework <see COMC81) 639 final>. 
See: A Community strategy to develop Europe's industry <Communication 
from the Commission to the Council) COMC81> 639 final, p. 2 
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The car industry is of s~preme importance for Europe, since the Co.-unity 
is the biggest world producer of cars. There are around 80 million vehicles 
in circulation in the EEC, a density of 310 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants, 
and a labour force which in ~979 accounted for 6~9% of the entire 
industrial sector. 
EEC car exports represented 10X of the total value of Ca..unity exports 
in 1979. 
The.se figures are quoted to show that the European car industry is of 
fund~ental importance to the Community economy. It can therefore ~t 
be allowed to suffer the same fate as sectors such as the household electronics, 
photographic, motorcycle, !tc. industries, in which Europe has been 
largely supplanted by Japan ,nd by recently industrialized countries. 
The Community clearly has no choice with regard to the measures to be 
implemented now and in the future with a view to solving the problems facing 
its car industry. This sector must be totally reorganized to enable it 
to face up to its two major competitors on the world ••rket - Japan and 
the·United States. 
This view was confirmed by Mr THORN during a meeting at the College 
of Europe in Bruges on 27 September 1982. On that occasion Mr THORN 
drew attention to the fa~t that J~pan must recognize the vital need for 
the Community automobile industry to be allowed sufficient time for 
restructuring; while restructuring is in progress adequate safeguard 
measures will have to be taken. 
This must be the starting point of any assessment. Only on the basis 
of a comparative analysis of Europe 1 S productive system and those of its 
competitors will it be possible to draw up a Community prograMme capable 
of reviving its car industry and overcoming the. lack of confidence which 
it is now facing and will cohtinue to face during the 1980s. 
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The crisis in the European car industry has its origins not only in the 
effects of Japanese competition but also in a completely new situation which 
has developed in the worLd economy over the last decade. 
After the period of almost constant growth in the 1960s, the world econa.y 
suffered serious upheavals in the 1970s which had an adverse effect on'tht 
operation of the European car industry. 
The principal causes of this change, to which Europe is particularly 
sensitive, are basically as follows: 
<a) sgoJ1!0S.tili.!O.g!l.2tiSI!: it is the car industry which, in the 
first instance, is most directly affected by the problems resulting 
from the continued oil crisis. The constant rise in prices and the 
uncertainty about oil supplies have had major consequences for the 
car industry. It has been necessary to introduce technological inno-
vations, requiring vast investments, in an attempt to cut oil consumption. 
There has been a gradual change in the clients' attitude to the •car 
product•. 
demand. 
There has been a substantial decline in the growth in 
Competition has stiffened at increasingly high technical 
and economic levels. The car mark•t has moved into what could be 
described as the mature phase of its life cycle and is very close to 
saturation point. For example, it is calculated that in the principal 
industrialized countries around 70X of all families, out of a possible 
maximum of 75-SOX, already own a car. The demand for cars in these 
countr·ies has therefore gradually become almost exclusively a demand 
for replacement cars (around SOX of cars registered>; 
(b) !b!-~20!iOYiD9-t!~I!!!2D-2!_1b!_0!1i2D!1.!~QOQ!l!!= this has weighed 
heavily on the car industry, making it difficult to implement the radical 
measures and massive investments needed to adjust it to new requirements; . 
(c) J!i!!st.S2!Q!!i!i20= the economic area in which the car industries 
have to operate has undergone major changes, particularly with regard 
to their competitiveness in areas with an increasingly small margin 
for manoeuvre; 
(d) Japanese penetration of the international car market, which was pre-
~ 
viously dominated by the European and US industries. 
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. 
1979 
-
These have been the main features of the crisis in the car industry 
during recent years and t~is is the context in which the Japanese car industry 
has established itself an~ deftly exploited t~e deficiencies of its com~e­
titors and the opportunit1es offered by an almost totally free international 
Market. The Japanese have succeeded fairly easily in establishing their 
products on this market because of specUi'c features of their productive 
and economic system and their social structure. 
The Community is now the second Largest producer of cars in the world. "ihe 
following table shows the voluMe of Community production and co.pares it 
with Japan and the USA. 
Table No. 1 
Car production in the EEC, Japan and the USA 
. Private cars Commercial vehicles Total 
Belgium 283,072 31,925 314,997 
Frc.nce 3,220,394 393,064 3,.613,458 
Itc.ly 1,480,904 150,106 1,631,010 
Netherlands 90,204 14,780 104,984 
West Germany 3.,. 932,556 317,169 4.249,725 
. United K i np,dom 1_.102, 015 408,440 1,510,455 
Total 10,109,145 1,315,484 11.,424,629 
Japa!" 6_.175,771 3,.459,775 9,635,546 
USA 8,433_,662 3,046,331 11.,479,993 
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1980 
.~ .. 
• Pdv&te cars Comr.tercial vehicles Total 
.... 
. 
Belgium 191,016 34,265 225,281 
France 2,938,581 439,852 3,378,433 
Italy 1,445,221 165,066 1,610,287 
Netherlands 80,779 15,656 96,435 
-we~t Germany 
• 3,520,934 357,619 3,878,553 United Kingdom 958,940 389,170 1,348,110 
Total : I 11lS 1 471 ·1,401,628 10,537,099 
Japan 7,038,108 4,.004,776 11,042 t 884. 
USA 6,375,506 1,63§,122 8,010,628 
1981 .. 
-
I 
Private cars Commercial vehicles Total 
Belr:iulfl 216,068 32,036 248,104 
France .2,611,264 407,506 3,019,370 
Itoly 1,257,340 176,403 1,433,743 
Netherlands 77,922 12,223 90,145 
Uest Germany 3,577,807 319,200 3,897,007 
United Kin~dOII 954,650 229,555 1,184,205 
Total 8,695,651 1,176,923 • 9,872,574 
Japan 6,974,131 4,205,831 11,179,962 
USA 6,253,138 1,68.0,007 7,933,145 
. 
Source: CLCA ~ VDA 
These tables show that Japan has overtaken the EEC in the production of 
motor vehicles. Between 1979 and 1981 European production fell sharply from 
11,424,629 to 9,872,574 vehicles. In the same period Japanese production rose 
from 9,635,546 to 11,179,962 vehicles. These figures clearly demonstrate that 
Japan has increased its production despite the fact that the European and world 
economy is passing through a period o~ crisis. 
It is also interesting to note that exports of Japanese cars to the EEC 
fell by 7.4% in 1981 as against 1980. However, this is an overall figure and 
Japanese exports continued to increase in the case of certain Member States 
<e.g. the Greek market>. 
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. 
A further point to be noted is that in the past ten years the EEC's trade deficit 
with Japan has risen from 8 . million dollars to 11,600 million dollars in 1981. 
These figures are-sw~fi~ient in-themselves to give_a general idea of ~~e aggressivity 
of the Japanese export sector - a point w~ich must be G~ressed in negotiations with 
the Japane·se in orae·r to create an unders_tanding of th-e need for Euf'opeaA industry, 
at least in the motor vehicle sector, to obtain self-timitation arrangement$ by 
Japan in respect of its exports of motor vehicles to Europe • 
. . -
The car industry·is of great importance with regard to employ~~ent~ 
The following table shows the number of people employed Jn this sector. 
5mQl2~mSOl-iD-1b~-s~£2QS!D-£!t_io~~~!!~£-12!~:12Z~ C1,000) -
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
FR of Gtrl\lany 634.1 591.5 589.7 619.5 646.9 672.8 
" 
France ._ 414.8 446.7 463.7 486.1 487 489.3 
·un i ted K; ngdom ·497.8 478.3 444.1 474.1. 486.7 . 471.6 
Italy 253.1 242.5 240.4 230.6 228.3 
Belgium 50.7 46.4 5().5 52.5 54.6 56 
LUicembourg 0.6 0.7 0.8 Q.8 0.8 
Ireland 7.6 7.2 7.0 7.0 6.2 6.1 
Denmark . 4.8 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.4 
Netherlands 22.8 21.8 21.4 22.4 22.7 24.1 
------------------------------------------------EEC 1,886~9 1,839.1 1,821.5 1,897.3 1,936.2 1,953.31 _____________________ :_ _________________________ ~ _________ ._ ______ _. __ _ 
§2Y!~~l-_5urostat - Employees in industry, CAEC 35 
1 These figures include both car assembly and the •anufacture of spare parts 
In 1979 the EEC's car exports accounted for 10X of the total value 
of its exports. 
The above figures give an idea of the size of the Community car induttry 
and its importance with regard to employment and the economies of the 
Member States. 
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Exports of Japanese cars to the Community are at present governed by the 
restrictive measures introduced between the individual Member Stat~s and Japan. 1 
The trading powtr of tht ComMunity car industry 11 now being threatened. 
The weakness of its position on the internal mark•t 4s illustrated by the 
extent of Japanese penetratio~. ln 1970 the Japanese accounted for 0.61 
of car sales in the Community, with a total of 48,000 cars. In 1_980 the 
figure was 8.9X, with 754,000 cars. 
In 1982 exports of Jap•nese cars to the Ca..unity showed a alight 
decline of 0.4X. 2 
'· 
1 Brief mention should be made of the quotas of Japanese cars i~PQrted 
into the individual Community Member States on the basis of bilateral 
agreements. 
- Italy allows imports of 2,200 Japanese cars a year. This quota has 
been applied since 1966, when Japan itself restricted imports of 
Italian cars. · 
- france limits imports of Japanese cars to 3X of the national market. 
• The United Kingdom has reached a voluntary restraint agreement with 
the Japanese car industry under which Japanese exports to the United 
Kingdom may not exceed 11X of the market (in 1980, however, Japanese 
cars accounted for 11.9% of the ma~ket)~. 
- I.n 1981 the Japanese again respectf!u the 11X limit on the basis of an agree-
ment between thP motor vehicle industries in the two countries. 
- In 1981 Japan agreed to voluntarily restrain exports to Belgium and 
Lux~mbourg resulting in a considerable reduction of Japanese exports to those 
two countries. Japanese exports to.Belgium in 1981 accounted for 25X of the 
market. In the case of the Netherlands, Japanese exports took 26.6% of the 
market in 1980 and 24.4% in 1981. · 
There are no restrictions in the other Member States. 
The Common Customs Tariff in this sector is 10.8% 
Source: Commission of the Europe~n Communities 
2 Statistical source •Ford' - January 1982 
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European exports, fell by 23X between 1970 and 1980, fro~~ 2.5 million 
to 1.9 million cars. Over the same period world exports increased by 
around 77% and Japanese exports by 426X. If the Community had maintained 
it' sha-re of world trade <over 51% of e~ports in 1970>, in 1980 it would 
have sold around 4.3 ~aillion cars, 2.4 million more than were actually 
sold. 1 
This deterioration in Community trade may become a permanent feature 
in the next few years and Europe could even become a net importer of car$ 
by 1985. 
To summarize briefly the causes of the crisis in the European car 
industry, it may be said that this industry is primarily a composite of 
national industries which, taken individually, are capable of withstanding 
competition from the Japanese and US car industries. As a whole, however, 
the European car industry is characterized by the wide variety of cars 
under construction and a harmful lack of coordination in the manufacture 
of parts. Moreover, the degree of industrial concentration is extremely 
low. In the United States and Japan the two major manufacturers control 
around 75% of~the mark~ts, whereas in the Community the biggest car 
industries are much smaller than their counterparts in Japan and the USA. 
The manufacture of components within the European car industry is 
unfortunately widely scattered and uncoordinated because the degree of 
industrial concentration in the Community is much lower than in Japan and 
the USA. 
It is interesting to note that Japan would now seem to be following a 
different policy of association, in particular with American manufacturers, 
which may represent a serious risk to the European automobile industry in the 
future. For example a meeting was recently held between the Ford Motor Company 
and Toyo-Kogyo <which manufactures the Mazda range). These two companies are 
studying the possibility of building a new car together which will be based 
largely on Japanese components but will be marketed world-wide, including 
the EEC countries, under the FORD brand. General Motors and Toyota are 
contemplating a similar association. The consequences of possible competition 
from this new Japanese-American vehicle for the European automobile industry 
vre self-evident. 
1 See Prospects for the Car Industry, European fact sheets 
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This brief analy,is shows ~hat the European car industry has within 
it a clear potential for progre,s in terms of improving its production 
systea, as compared with its Japanese competitors whose operation has in 
certain respects reached an optimum level. 
Whereas the industrialized West is now in the throes of crisis, the 
Japanese economy appears to have an extremely sound structure. Japan's 
gross national product increased in 1980 by 5% in real terms. The rate 
of inflation was held below 5% for consumer prices and 1% for wholesale 
prices. At the end of 1981 there was a balance of p~yments surplus of 
around 10,000 million dollars. Unemployment affects only 21 of the working 
population. Industrial productivity has grown by an annual average of 
3% under the stimulus, in particular, of the high technology sectors. 
The reasons for the Japanese economic success are ~t to be sought 
only in terms of the obstacles raised to the entry of European products 
onto the Japanese market but al~o, and above all, in terms of the standards 
of efficiency which guide Japan's management of its own resources. 
The competitiveness of Japanese products, including cars, is not a result 
on~y of low salaries, but of·other factors such as the·organization of 
production, product marketing, the availability of adequate financial 
resources and, within limits yet to be ascertained, probably also the par1ty 
of the Yen. 
Rather than a system of industrial giants, with the ec~nomies of scale 
which would have resulted,.Japan has pursued an intrinsically contrary 
course, aiming at decentralization and industrial speciatization. As 
a result, Japanese industry now romprises small productive units specializing 
in specific phases of production and closely interlinked, which fora a 
structure which is homogeneous, flexible and easily adapted to demand. 
While pursuing this policy of ~ispersing the production process, Japan 
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has nevertheless succeeded in achieving a high level of centralization 
in the field of marketing, particularly with regard to foreign markets. 
This has enabled the privat• sector in Japan to take maximum advantage 
of the opportunities offered by scale economies in the field of distribut~on. 
Japanese exporters have thus had at their disposal efficient structures 
which have made it easy for them to overcome the inevitable problems arising 
from different social and legal systems. 
One of the keyst~es of Japanese competitiveness is thus to be found 
in the decentralization and specialization of the production process and 
the centralization of the marketing function. 
The ,Japanese phenomenon is in fact extremely complex. Briefly, 
competition between Europe and the USA is primarily a confrontation between 
two ageing industrial structures. Japan has succeeded in entering the 
scene with a young and more competitive structure. The freedom of inter-
national trade which has·characterized the post-war period has been dis-
tinctly favourable to J~an. -Its car industry is based on a system 
characterized by high technology and, as already pointed out, extensive 
organizational capacity and flexibility. 
The Japanese success is not due only to low salaries, protectionism, state 
subsidies or the appropriation of technology developed elsewhere. Japan 
has essentially solved the problems of industrial reconversion affecting 
all the western countries by applying rigorously and consistently the rules 
of an industrial society and anticipating in good time solutions for 
industrial sectors in crisis such·as iron and steel, shipbuilding, textiles 
etc. 
Conversion work ~n Japanese car factories is accomplished very rapidly 
and, with a production level which in 1980 exceeded 7.3 million units, 
Japanese manufacturers can allow themselves the luxury of setting up a 
new plant for every new car model. The Japanese car industry is characterized 
by this constant effort to ensure up-to-date structures and maximum use 
of equipment. 
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The Japanese car industry also benefits fro. a high level of social 
cohesion and awareness of the general interest. This enables the major 
car firms to rely on their suppliers without h•ving to carry out checks 
on quality or on~the nu~ber of parts. An important consequence of this 
is that the problem of inventories, which is extremely serious in the 
European car industry,, is vi rtuall·y unknown· in Japan. 
Technological innovation, automation and the organization of management 
have been suitably and effectively developed and are now one of the corner-
stones of Japan's industrial structure. 
---- The strong position which the Japanese car industry now occupies on 
the world market is therriore attributable not to circumstantial and 
ephe11eral factors but, on the con,trary, to detailed planning. 
Attention should finally be drawn to one element which has 11ade a 
substantial contribution to t'he· strong competitive position' of Japanese 
products - the ~eriod of use of the production apparatus, which is. partly 
. 
determined by the working conditions of the labour force and the way the 
equip11ent is used. 
In the West, car manufacturers are conditioned by high costs and 
restrictions il!lpoud by legiti•ate social progress •. 
Japanese manufacturers basi~ally have total freedom to use night and 
holiday work and to implement a ,longer working year. Japanese workers 
have shorter holidays and the wi~espread practice of staggering holidays 
means that the factories do not ~ecessarily have to close. Absenteeism 
is much lower in Japan than in Europe. 
To conclude, it is primarily the 'labour force• factor <considered 
in the context of the employer - employee relationship), together with 
custom and labour legislation, which gives Japanese manufacturers a 
decisive advantage over their competitors in terms of productivity and 
costs. 
These factors affect the pr~uction process in both a vertical and 
a horizontal direction, that is, from the piece of steel to the finished 
-product, and in relations between the major car manufacturers and their 
principal suppliers and subcontractors. 
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A whole range of ••vantages thus enables Japanese manufacturers to 
place their finished pr,ducts on the car market at an extremely competitive 
price. 
Assisted by these special advantages, the Japanese car industry has 
been able at a tiMely moment to exploit free trade to the utmost. 
Between 1979 and 1980 car production in Japan increased by 14X (around 
~ne million more cars>. Exports rose by 27.2X from 3,100,000 to 
3,916,000 cars, while .Japanese imports fell by 25.4X.1 
Japanese exports have increased on the various markets. The growth 
and volume of these exports are shown in the following table. 
1 Source: Alfa Ro.eo planning and studies· 
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TABLE 3: Japanese penetration of various Markets fro• 1968 to 1979 
<X of new cars registered> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. I I I I I • 1 Year 1 1 1 1 1 F1 rst Months Most recent months, 
f 1968 I 1970 I 1972 I 1975 I 1979 I 1980 I for which figures I 
I I I I I I I · 2 I Market 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 ava1 table , 
------------------------ ~----------------~--------~--------~--------li--------~--------~---------------------1 
FR of Germany 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
.united Kingdom 
Greece 
Norway 
!Netherlands 
;sweden 
0.1 
0.05 
3.1 
1.6 
14.9 
0.6 
0.2 
3.9 
1.2 
0.1 
0.05 
0.9 
. 4.9 
3.4 
18.3 
0.2 
0.4 
15.5 
11.4 
3.1 
0.7 
0.3 
7.2 
10.0 
7.1 
19.2 
0.4 
2.9 
15.8 
9.5 
1.7 
5.4 
16.5 
14.7 
20.8 
1.5 
9.0 
17.2 
28.3 
15.5 
5.6 
12.4 
18.0 
18.1 
23.9 
2.2 
1o.e 
21.81 
24.2 
9.5 
18.0 
23.9 
29.9 
3.1 
12.8 
38.1 
13.1 
20.6 
29.2 
31.0 
4.1 
19.7 
44.2 
(7) 
(7) 
(8} 
(7) 
(8) 
'(8) 
(7) 
25.3 31.0 19.5 (7) 
2.8 l 6.5 10.0 13.3 14.7 (7) 
I 
iswitzerland 1.5 5.6 13.7 I 8.4 16.0 21.2 27.5 (7) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
·------------------------~-----------------~---------i---------~--------~---------~--------~--------------------i ~United States I . 1.2 I 3.5 I 5.5 I 9.·3 I 15.8 I 21.0 I 23.0 (7) I 
;-----------------------~---------------~---------i---------i---------i-- ~--------~-------------------~ 
·Australia I I 15.4 I 19.6 I 32.1 I I I i 
I I I I I I I 1 
·New zealand I I 6.3 I 11.8 I 23.8 I 48.1t I I I 
• I I I I ·1 11 I I 
aLibya I I 10.9 I I 38.5 I 51 • .1 : : I 
, ________________________ J _________________ J _________ J---------~---------J---------~--------~---------------------~ 
1 1978 
2 The figures in brackets indicate the month: <7> for July, <8> for August, etc.; 
some of these figures are still provisional 
Source: SMMT - CSCA 
The expansion of the Japanese car industry has been achieved principally 
through its exports. A further important point is that the increase in 
Japanese exports has come at a time when the world car market is not expanding. 
The Japanese success has thus been achieved at the expense of their 
competitors and not by gaining a gr~ater share of an expanding market. 
The increasing growth in sales of J'panese cars in Europe in the last few 
years therefore raises an extremely serious problem, since it has occurred 
at a time when most of the European markets are going through a period of 
stagnation which is in itself already creating difficulties for our industry. 
This is why the European car industry is now particularly vulnerable to 
the problems raised by the penetration onto the market of its Japanese 
competitors. 
VI. THE JAPANESE MARKET 
-------------------
In the last ten years the trade balance between the EEC and Japan have 
increased significantly in the latter's favour, rising from s 8 million to 
S 14,000 million. 
This situation is the result primarily of the fact that the structure 
and operation.of the Japanese market are such that it is extremely difficult 
for European exporters to gain access to it. 
These difficulties led the Community to draw up a 'list of requests' 
in December 1981, which called for substantial tariff reductions to be 
introduced as soon as possible. 
The Japanese Government announced'measures to open up its market. 
It was observed in the Community that, although these measures were 
encouraging in that they revealed~ some political awareness on Japan's part, 
in practice they have had very limited effect on trading trends and have not 
constitutedthe response the Commu~ity was looking for. 
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Although Japan has in theory shown its willingness to take account of 
the Community's requests the action it has taken does not come up to the 
Community's expectations. 
As a result the Council decided to have recourse to the procedures 
provided for in Article XXIII of GATT. 
Since the Community did not obtain the hoped-for results in 
negotiations with Japan in the context of GATT, on 25 March 1182 the 
community officially lodged a petition with the Japanese authorities. 
In the ~riod May-June 1981 consultative meetings were held in Geneva between 
the Community bodies and the Japanese authorities. 
- -Rec~~;~e to A-;;i~ le XXIII <1) (b) and- (c) of GATT results from the 
failure to make any substantial progress towards obtaining an agreement 
from Japan to accept imports of manufactured goods, despite the formal 
. . 1 
liberalization of tradewhich should have followed the GATT negot1at1ons. 
1Ar·ticleXlCIII (1)(b) concerns the nullification or interment of bPnefits 
resulting from the introduction by ~he contracting party of measures 
of any kind which conflict with the-provisions of GATT. 
In the case in question, that is the petition lodged by the Commun1ty, for 
the purposes of paragraph 1<b> the measures involved relate to !!!OQi!Q!£ 
!~!!iD9_!QQ_!le~:!ee!2~!1· Japan has tended to apply its own specific 
testing .and approval procedures which effectively prevent European products 
from gaining access to its market. Paragraph 1Cb> also covers £Y!12m! 
e!2£f9Y!f! which create difficulties for foreign firms, since they are 
frequently extremely complex and ti~e-consuming and call for highly com-
plicated documentation. On 1 April.1982 the Japanese authorities introduced 
measures designed to simplify these procedures. Whether these measures are 
proving effective is not yet known. 
Article XXIII(1)(c) concerns the existence of a specific situation which may 
impair or nullify the benefits whic~ European exporters should derive from 
the GATT negotiations. The situati9n in Japan is one of Oo.inance by a 
small number of trade associations, of close verticaL links between large 
companies and small and medium-sized undertakings, the specific rote played 
by industrial association~ etc., and this situation leads to major resistance 
on the Japanese market to imports of manufactured products and hence also of 
European cars. 
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To resolve the problems which have arisen in relation to Article XXIIIC1)(b) 
the Japanese have created the Office of Trade Ombudsman <OTO) which is 
designed to deal with most of the complaints made by the community concerning 
non-tariff barriers. It ;s possible to draw an initial general conclusion 
from the above. To resolve the problem of access to the Japanese market for 
manufactured products, and hence also cars, exported by the Community, it 
is necessary to tackle the fundamental cause of the difficulties in trade 
between Europe and Japan, that is, ~o overcom@ ~apan•s reluctance 
to import such products from the EEC. In recent months meetings have been 
held between the two parties, but their outcome has not shown substantial 
progress towards the adoption of far-reaching measures and major changes in 
Japanese policy as regards opening up its markets to EEC experts. 
As far as the subject of this report is concerned, specific reference 
should be made to the application of Article XXIII (1)(b) of GATT with 
regard to the standards, testing, type-approval and customs procedures 
which are causing serious difficulties for Community undertakings wishing 
to export manufactured goods and hence cars to Japan. Account should be 
taken of the concept of reciprocity which should justifably be applied in 
such cases. Thus, the attitude adopted by the EEC towards Japanese products 
exported to thP. Community should be the same as that of Japan towards 
Community products. The car sector is one in which it would clearly be 
logical to apply this concept of reciprocity. 
The Community could tackle the problem of our exports to Japan in an 
intersectoral context and by means of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 
Since, despite a number of measures which show some willingness in this 
area, Japan has not yet in practice made a decisive move towards a policy of 
accepting EEC exports, the initiative taken by the Council under Article 
XXIII <2> of GATT should be supported. A working party should therefore be 
set up to investigate the problems. The high-level working party should 
also be requested .to continue its work and to seek to achieve scientific 
and technical ·cooperation with Japan. 
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The loss of the car industry would permanently jeopardize the Community's 
industrial and economic potential iD!!£-~!il because of the close links 
with other important industries such as glass, tyres, etc. 
The Community clearly has no choice with regard to the measures to 
be taken no~ and in the future to resolve the problems facing its car industry. 
The industry must be totally restruct~red to enable it to compete with its 
two major competitors on the world market - Japan and the United States. · 
In order to implement appropriate and effective measures with a view 
to restoring the competitive position of its car industry, the Community 
must: 
<a> in accordance with the Commission's guidelines 
- implement an effective European industrial policy which should include 
measures for the restructuring of the entire European car industry; 
- within industrY; encourage c~oser cooperation between European firms 
with a view to competing inc~easingly at international level. 
Community supervision in this area would guarantee the necessary 
transparency, prevent the rush for national aids and facilitate the 
necessary adjustments; 
- with regard to financing, provide for adequate investMent program.es 
thro~gh loans; 
- with regard to technology, promote innovation with a view to pro-
ducing under competitive conditions, vehicles which meet requireMents 
relating to energy, safety~and the quality of the environment. 
Joint research measures mu~t be extended in this field to prevent 
' duplication and to develop· a Community plan. The Community as a 
whole is already providing as much finance as its principal competitors 
but the results achieved are unsatisfactory because of the dispersion 
of the measures undertaken and the lack of reciprocal information; 
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- in regional and social terms, achieve greater understanding between 
the economic and social sectors in order to promote an improvement 
in conditions and more effective exploitation of the meant of pro-
duction; 
- free the Community mar~et from all obstacles which restrict trade 
with regard not only to technical specifications but also to legisla-
tion, transport, insurance, taxes, etc. It is extremely i~rtant 
to exploit the internal Community market, since' it is the second 
largest in the world after the United States; 
-achieve greater balance on the world market by establishing a dialogue 
between the principal producer zones. Europeans will make their 
voice heard more effectively if they present a united front to their 
partners. The Community must therefore pursue an appropriate 
commercial policy vis-A-vis thir~ countries; 
(b) in addition to the Commission's guidelines 
- in compliance with the directives set out in the mandate of 30 May 
1980, implement measures relating to the internal market on the basis 
of a global concept (i.e. which includes the problems facing the 
car industry). The aim should be to provide the best possible 
economic conditions for undertakings by offering them an economic 
area in which they can invest on terms comparable with those enjoyed 
by their US and Japanese competitors; 
- implement 1n effective industrial policy adapted to the new requirements 
of European industry which encourages innovation by making use of 
new technologies, and increases competitiveness and which will provide 
the framework and stimulus needed for the restructuring of the 
European car industry; 
- implement a Community export strategy based on cooperation and consul-
tation at int~rnational level; 
- develop a European scheme of credit 1nd tax facilities; 
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~-develop and extend a constructive dialogue between employers and 
em~loyees within the trade unions with a view to harmonizing demands 
&t European level and preventi~g the creation of disparities between 
social conditions in the various Community industries which would 
' 
v1t-hout doubt- lead to excessively diverse and exaggerated conditions 
of competition; 
• organize at European level a single policy in the components sector 
which would help to reduce costs and wea~en competition between 
lur~an industries; 
• aecept that the period of res~ructuring needed to restore the ca.peti• 
tive position of tht European car industry must be accompanned by 
appropriate safeguard measures. In this connectton the car· industry 
could be treated in the same "'ay as new industries which·, even in 
a free tr&de situation and in total compliance wtth th-e p-rin·cipln 
of the Treaty of Rome, may be assi$ted for an appropriate p-eriod 
by safeguard measures which are essential for consolidation·. 
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Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. COTTRELL pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules 
of Procedure on Japanese car manufa~ture in the European Community· (Doc. 1-313/81) 
------------------------~--------------------~--~---------------------------------
-observing with regret the conclusion of bilateral agreements between certain 
Member States and Japan to restrict imports of cars manufactured in Japan, 
- observing that an agreement covering the entire Community would in practice 
serve the interests of the industry in Europe to a far greater extent, 
- noting the continued serious imbalance between car imports from Japan to the 
Community and exports by European manufacturers to Japan, 
- noting the conclusion of certain agreements between some European manufacturers 
and Japanese companies and aware of proposals for further agreements, 
- welcoming 9!D~iD! cooperation between Europe and Japan in car manufacture, 
insofar as investment capital may be attracted, 
-declaring, however, that the establishment of manufacturing forward bases 
inside the Community may be a device by Japan to nullify any proposals for 
quotas or further restrictions on imports, 
- aware, too, that Japanese manufacturing arrangements within the Community 
m~!! include strict rules concerning supply and the percentage of European-
manufactured components, 
- noting the concern expressed by some European manufacturers that Japanese 
assembly plants in Europe - no matter how welcome they might be in certain 
depressed areas - could well present substantial competition problems and lose 
more jobs than are gained, 
1. Requests the Commission to ins~itute a full survey of the entire area, including 
<a> present state of quota. limits on Japanese car imports into the Community 
(b) an assessment of the economic impact of Japanese manufacture within the 
Community 
(c) a full investigation of t~e potential impact on employment 
(d) an investigation into the competition impact on European-based manufacturers 
and to make fresh proposals to the Council with regard to concluding a Community 
agreement on car imports/manufa,cture with Japan, irrespective of existing bilateral 
arrangements by Member States or companies; 
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission of the 
European Communities. 
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Motion for a resolution for entry in the register, tabled by Mr WELSH, 
Sir Fred CATHERWOOD, Sir John STEWART-CLARK and Sir Fred WARNER on imports 
of Japanese automobiles <Doc. 1-203~81) 
------------------------------------------------~-------------------------. . 
- noting that the Japanese have und,rtaken to restrain their exports of 
motor vehicles to the United Stat~s, 
- aware that in 1980 Japanese impor~s accounted for 11X of the Community 
market, 
- noting that Japanese output of motor vehicles increased by 14.6X in 1980 
whereas Community production fell by 6.4X, 
-noting that the Community's global deficit with Japan increased from S 7.1 
billion in 1979 to S 10 billion in 1980, 
- recalling that the Japanese have ~lready indicated their willingness to 
' 
consider measures to restrict exports to Europe, 
1. Considers that the recent Japanese-American understanding could pose a threat 
to Community manufacturers of motor vehicles; 
2. Believes that regulation of the trade in motor vehicles must be conducted on 
a multilateral basis; 
3. Urges the Commission to seek im~ediate clarification of the nature of the 
Japanese-American understanding and report to Parliament; 
4. Requests the Council to authorize the Commission to open negotiations with 
the Americans and the Japanese to regulate trade in motor vehicles on the 
basis of a united European position; 
5. Requests its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission 
of the European Communities. 
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